More than meets the eye: Blindness, talent and autism by Pring, Linda & Tadic, Valerija
Chapter 2  
More Than Meets the Eye: Blindness, Talent and Autism  
 
We have all come across blindness and for the most part think of it as a sensory-
perceptual loss for which the remaining functional sensory channels like hearing or 
touch can provide some compensation. However, in the case of autism the 
impairments in communication, in social understanding and imagination, as well as 
the ritualistic and obsessional behaviours seem to be features of a developmental 
disorder that cannot easily be compensated for. In certain respects these individuals 
are “blind” to some aspects of the world around them, and this has consequences for 
their behaviour. In the first part of this chapter we explore some of the associations 
between autism and blindness by focusing on early childhood behaviour. Three 
single case studies are presented that illustrate important features discussed in the 
theoretical considerations. In the second part of the chapter the impact of blindness 
beyond the early developmental years, is considered in the context of memory 
performance.  One suggestion given prominence concerns the role of musical pitch 
memory and this links with the final section where talent is considered. Research 
with artists and musicians both with and without autism is used to illustrate a 
cognitive style that may be associated with the development of talents. The 
connections, with reference to the development of talent, autism and blindness, are 
examined. In the early 1980’s there seemed no direct association between these, but 
as we will describe in this chapter it may be that there is more to this than meets the 
eye.  
 
 RESEARCH IN EARLY CHILDHOOD BEHAVIOURS 
 
Theory of mind: Theoretical considerations 
Visual experience provides children and infants with a rich source of information 
about themselves and their surroundings. Through vision children are able to 
observe connections among other people’s expressions of emotion and witness the 
context within which various feelings arise. For such reasons vision can be seen to 
play a critical role in the development of Theory of Mind. 
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Theory of Mind refers to the “every day” ability to understand other people’s beliefs, 
thoughts and desires in order to explain and predict their behaviour.  With the ability 
to infer mental states, like the true and false beliefs of one-self and others, children 
become more capable of participating in a wide range of conversational and social 
interactions. Many studies now indicate that in almost all normally developing 
children theory of mind develops by the age 4-5 (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987).  
 
With his modular account of mind Baron-Cohen (1995) has argued that the 
monitoring of others eye direction and subsequent integration of this with a “shared 
visual attention mechanism” plays a key role in establishing a Theory of Mind module 
in the developing infant. Similarly, in the “theory-theory” account originally offered by 
Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993), visual imitation provides the starting point for Theory of 
Mind development, requiring the child to map the seen movements of others onto the 
felt movements of self in order to produce an imitation. Furthermore, Hobson (1993) 
described foundations of Theory of Mind and interpersonal understanding in terms of 
a child taking part in triadic interactions, mainly visually based.  Through joint 
attention behaviours (i.e. gaze monitoring, following points and producing proto-
declarative points) that involve the child, an object or event and another person, the 
child is able to comprehend the attitude of the other person towards the object.  
These joint attention behaviours, that involve triadic co-ordination or sharing of 
attention, emerge in typical development between 6 and 12 months (Leekam & 
Moore, 2001) and are usually carried out in the visual modality (Hobson, 1993). 
 
Significantly, disruption of joint attention behaviours has been given a central role in 
autism. More specifically, typical disturbances in social and communicative 
development seen in autism has been linked with impairment of Theory of Mind 
abilities, which is seen as the core deficit in autism (Happé, 1993). It is not surprising 
then that children who are autistic have consistently been found to perform poorly on 
so-called false belief tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Lesly & Frith, 1985). Such tasks 
specifically require children to use their ability to infer mental states in order to 
predict other people’s behaviours and beliefs.  
 
Hobson (1993) was amongst the first to suggest a functional overlap in the 
developmental psychopathology of children who are congenitally blind and children 
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who are autistic. In the case of children who are blind this is likely to be associated 
with the fact that without vision (and joint attention) they are denied the chance to 
associate emotional and mental states with their behavioural correlates. Brown, 
Hobson, Lee and Stevenson (1997) found that a lower ability group of children with 
visual impairment (verbal IQ<70) could not be distinguished from children with 
autism by their scores on checklists of autistic-like behaviours whereas a higher 
ability group (verbal IQ>70) showed a higher level of these behaviours than normally 
developing children. Similarly, some children with profound congenital visual 
impairment (and no other impairments) have been found to have problems with false 
belief tasks at chronological and verbal mental ages older than 4 years therefore 
demonstrating a delay in Theory of Mind development (Peterson, Peterson & Webb, 
2000; Green, Pring & Swettenham, 2003;).  
 
Indeed, some children with profound visual impairment have been found to resemble 
sighted children who are autistic in various aspects. The similarities include 
abnormalities in social-communicative competence ( Fraiberg, 1977), difficulty in 
emotional expressiveness and emotional recognition (Minter, Hobson & Pring, 1991; 
Rogers & Puchalski, 1986), a characteristic pattern in use of creative symbolic play 
and language (e.g. echolalia and pronoun reversal) (Andersen, Dunlea & Kekelis, 
1984), mannerisms and stereotypical ritualistic behaviour (Chess, 1971) and 
impairments in cognitive abilities such as abstract thinking (Wills, 1981). 
 
The development of social cognition in children who are blind  
Sarah Cupples (now Green) as a postgraduate student of Pring and Swettenham's 
adopted the approach taken by Hobson (1993). Children with profound visual 
impairment were presented with standard false-belief tasks, such as the Sally-Anne 
Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), Containers Task and Boxes Task (Minter et al., 
1998), as well as other tasks assessing the understanding of more advanced tests of 
Theory of Mind (e.g. Strange Stories Task by Happé, 1994; also see Pring, Dewart & 
Brockbank, 1999). These tasks involve second-order false-belief understanding, 
such as “I know that you know that I am not telling the truth” as well as the 
understanding of sarcasm and irony. Overall Cupples/Green's research (2001) 
supported of Hobson’s findings that children without vision appear to be at a 
significant disadvantage in understanding Theory of Mind, even when they are 
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several years older than their sighted counterparts. On the other hand, even though 
the majority of children who are blind experience difficulties with false belief 
understanding and more advanced aspects of social cognition (Cupples, Pring and 
Swettenham, 1999; Minter et al., 1998) Cupples et al. observed that some children 
without vision show little or no difficulty at all in this area. More interestingly, those 
children with profound visual impairment who pass first-order false belief tasks have 
been found to be no different from sighted children in their performance on second-
order false beliefs (Cupples et al., 1999). It seems that once children who are 
visually impaired understood first-order false beliefs, their advanced understanding 
seems to “catch up” with that of sighted children. On some occasions however, a 
more profound deficit can be observed and such children will not be able to make up 
for this deficit (Cupples et al., 1999). Researchers in the area (e.g. Brown et al. 1997; 
Hobson, Lee & Brown,1999; Cupples et al., 1999) agree that it is likely that verbal 
ability plays a very significant role in this process and subsequent outcome. 
 
Three case studies - Katy, Robert and John 
Some of the characteristics described above can perhaps best be illustrated by 
referring to individual case studies. The data was originally collected by Cupples and 
we present our interpretation of it below.  
 
The three children described here were chosen because they exemplified 3 different 
ways in which Theory of Mind development may proceed in children with congenital 
and total sight loss. They were matched by chronological and mental age, which in 
all three children was within normal range (as assessed by WISC-R, 1976 and 
WPPSI, 1967). The children were assessed on two occasions with approximately a 
year in between. 
 
Katy was first assessed at 6 years and 8 months and was 7 years and 11 months at 
the time of the second session. Her visual impairment is the result of Leber’s 
Amaurosis, a congenital retinal disorder (Good, 1993).  Katy had been in a 
mainstream school setting since pre-school.  Her verbal skills were extremely good 
(IQ=145) and she showed a consistently high ability pattern across the five WISC-R 
verbal sub-tests (see Table 2.1). Katy was responsive and chatty during the testing 
sessions and told the researcher that she enjoyed activities such as playing ‘schools’ 
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with her friends, playing hide and seek, making collages and pictures and sometimes 
pretending to be other people. 
 
The youngest of the children, Robert was first assessed at the age of 6 years and 6 
months and was 7 years and 9 months at the time of the second session. His visual 
impairment is a result of an inherited syndrome called Norrie’s Dissease (Webster & 
Roe, 1998). Robert, like Katy, attended a mainstream school at the time of the 
testing. His verbal IQ was found to fall within a normal range (IQ=90) even though 
there were some inconsistencies in his verbal ability, with relative weakness on the 
Information and Comprehension sub-tests but strength on the Vocabulary sub-tests 
(WPPSI, 1967). At an informal interview Robert proved to be very good at imitating 
voices and said that he liked using cassette machines and making his friends laugh 
by telling them jokes. He also reported that he never pretended to be another person 
because he did not “have any favourite characters”. 
 
The oldest of the children, John, was 8 years and 1 month at the time of the first 
session and was 9 years old at the second session. His visual impairment was 
congenital but without a specific diagnosis. He attended a mainstream school at the 
time of the testing and even though his verbal IQ was within a normal range (IQ=95) 
he showed an inconsistent pattern of verbal abilities with relative strength on Digit 
Span and weakness on Comprehension (WISC-R, 1976). John told the researcher 
that he likes playing on his computer and brailler and making Lego/Duplo models 
with his friends but that he never engaged in pretend play. 
 
Place Table 2.1 about here 
 
The three children were initially assessed on first-order false belief tasks (i.e. Sally-
Anne Task, Containers Task and Boxes Task) and some advanced Theory of Mind 
tasks (a modified version of Strange Stories Task by Happé, 1994). Based on tasks 
devised by Baron-Cohen (1989), they were additionally assessed on second-order 
Theory of Mind understanding. Finally we (Cupples, Pring, Swettenham & Tadic) 
examined the relationship between performance on assessments of Theory of Mind 
development and everyday social skills. We were interested to find out what patterns 
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of ‘real life’ social competence could be found in children who are congenitally blind, 
regardless of their performance on standard Theory of Mind assessments.  
 
Katy, Robert and John clearly exhibited a different pattern of performance on 
standardized assessments of Theory of Mind understanding as illustrated in Table 
2.2. Katy showed extremely good understanding of Theory of Mind overall. Her 
performance on the assessment of false belief of first and second order is in line with 
the performance of sighted children of the same age (Cupples et al. 1999). Robert 
on the other hand showed a clear initial delay in Theory of Mind development relative 
to his verbal and mental age and the sighted pattern of development but over a 
period of 15 months had shown a dramatic improvement passing the first and 
second-order false belief tasks. John however showed an inconsistent pattern in 
Theory of Mind development in that he showed some understanding of first-order 
false belief tasks initially but failed to pass the Theory of Mind tasks overall when 
assessed again 11 months later, suggesting a longer-term delay in this area of 
development. 
 
Place Table 2.2 about here 
 
The heterogeneity in development illustrated here confirms earlier findings that while 
some children with profound sight loss show good understanding of Theory of Mind, 
as shown in a false-belief paradigm, some children who are blind experience a delay 
and some even a regression in this area of development (Cupples, et al. 1999). This 
picture is in line with Fraiberg (1977) and many other clinicians who feel that children 
who are profoundly visually impaired are more heterogeneous in their developmental 
patterns than other groups of children with and without impairments. This may be 
related to the special role of the development of language in such children.  
 
We suggest that the patterns in Theory of Mind development seen in our study may 
in turn reflect the patterns in language development in children who are blind. Indeed 
the development of Theory of Mind has been closely linked to language 
development, the implicit understanding being that a child’s developing knowledge 
and appreciation of their own and other’s mental states must be facilitated by 
language (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 1993). A relationship between 
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verbal IQ and Theory of Mind ability has already been observed in children with 
autism in whom language competence was found to make a significant, positive 
impact on their performance of Theory of Mind tasks (Happé, 1995). Can the 
performance of the children described here shed light on these issues?  
 
Even though all three children had a verbal IQ within a normal range Katy, who 
showed a very good overall understanding of Theory of Mind, had a particularly high 
verbal IQ. More specifically, her verbal mental age at the time when she was 6 years 
and 8 months old was 9 years and 8 months (154 on the Williams scale). It seems 
plausible to suggest that such high verbal ability may have helped Katy pass false 
belief and advanced Theory of Mind tasks all along. But what about children like 
Robert and John? 
 
A number of developmental studies have shown that there are deviations and delays 
in language development and vocabulary acquisition in children who are blind (e.g. 
Andersen, Dunlea & Kekelis, 1984; Landau & Gleitman, 1985). These deviations and 
delays may be a consequence of a parent/child communication style where attention 
in a child without vision cannot be caught and directed by eye-contact, leading to a 
more restricted and less rich language input (Andersen et al., 1984). However, it 
seems that this can, in the long run be overcome and during the school years the 
language of children who are blind “catches up” (Landau & Gleitman, 1985). Once a 
child with profound visual impairment achieves a certain competence in verbal ability 
they make a big leap in their social cognitive development. This might explain the 
initial delay in Theory of Mind development in children like Robert at the age when 
he was first tested.  
 
However, the question remains why some children fail to progress, and in John’s 
case, even regress in this area of development. Some clinicians (e.g. Dale & 
Sonksen, 2002) describe a phenomenon of serious developmental disruption or 
“setback” which seems to occur between 15 and 27 months of age. One explanation 
for the setback occurring in the children with profound visual impairment is the notion 
of a sensitive or critical period of brain development in the first to second year of life 
that is dependent on the visual experience that would be expected at this age (see 
Dale & Sonksen, 2002). Another explanation is that development had not been 
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“normal” before the setback but that a change seems more apparent in older children 
because the tests and batteries assessing social and cognitive abilities may detect 
such changes better at this age. 
 
Testing everyday social competence   
To explore “real life” social competence, we adapted the approach taken by Frith, 
Happé and Siddons (1994). Everyday social skills and adaptation were assessed 
through the reports of caregivers (i.e. teacher and/or LSA) using the Vineland 
Adaptive Behaviour Scales - VABS (Sparrow, Balla & Cichetti, 1984) and Active and 
Interactive Sociability Items (devised by Frith et al., 1994). The children’s “personal 
and social sufficiency” (Sparrow et al., 1984) was assessed on three out of nine sub-
domains of behaviour measured by VABS namely: communication, social coping 
skills and interpersonal relationships. The additional items on Active and Interactive 
sociability adapted from Frith et al. were used to assess behaviours that could be 
performed with (Interactive) and without (Active) ability to “mentalize”.  
Some of these items were of particular interest because of their possible connection 
to underlying Theory of Mind ability. For instance, social coping skills involve 
behaviours such as apologizing for mistakes and responding appropriately to 
meeting strangers, both of which require an awareness of other people’s thoughts 
and feelings. Similarly, interpersonal relationships such as having friends and 
showing thoughtfulness in gifts also show awareness of other people’s feelings and 
ideas. 
 
In their study with 24 children with autism Frith et al. (1994) found a relationship 
between performance on false belief tasks and the scores on the VABS and 
interactive sociability. More specifically, those children with autism who passed first-
order Theory of Mind had higher scores on VABS communication domain and 
Interactive Sociability items than those who failed the tasks, notably our research 
yielded the same pattern. Katy, who showed extremely good performance on Theory 
of mind assessment, received higher scores on Expressive Communication (VABS) 
and Interactive Sociability than Robert and John whose Theory of mind 
understanding was delayed (see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3). 
 
Place Table 2.3 about here 
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 However, on certain VABS items all three children, regardless of their IQ and Theory 
of Mind ability showed unusual and perhaps limited social competence skills. All 
three were reported to have less than adequate social coping skills as assessed by 
VABS. Furthermore, all scored in the low range on the assessment of Active and 
Interactive sociability (Table 2.3). In addition, the Active sociability scores in this 
group were lower than the mean score gained by two groups of children with autism 
(those who passed and those who did not pass Theory of Mind tasks) studied by 
Frith and colleagues. We speculate that one explanation for this discrepancy is that 
specific Active sociability items may assess behaviours that are likely to be 
particularly affected by lack of vision, in particular sharing of toys, initiating social 
contact and showing appropriate table manners. Nevertheless the low scores were 
somewhat surprising and provide some insight into the way the parents and 
caregivers viewed the children (e.g. Robert’s parents refer to his behaviour as ‘being 
a bit of a handful’).   
 
The pattern of findings seen here reiterates the association between autism and 
blindness and ability level. Brown et al. (1997), for example, found that the children 
who were blind and obtained low IQ scores showed a tendency to score higher on 
the Childhood Autism Rating Scale - CARS (Schopler, Reichler & Renner, 1988) 
than those with high IQ scores, indicating a link between low mental ability and 
autistic-like features in children who are congenitally blind. Even though Katy, Robert 
and John were within the normal IQ range and none of the children were assessed 
for autistic-like features per se, some aspects of their everyday social skills bear 
resemblance to behaviours exhibited by children who are on the autistic spectrum. 
This is particularly true in the case of John whose assessments of both Theory of 
Mind understanding and everyday social competence were at a low level. John’s 
difficulty in concentrating may have had an adverse effects on his false-belief task 
performance. Nevertheless, even though his real life social competence is better 
than his scores on Theory of Mind tasks, it still falls below the range expected for the 
sighted children and closely resembles that of children with autism who can master 
the first-order false belief. Similarly, in the case of Robert, catching up on delayed 
Theory of Mind development does not seem to lead to improvement in everyday 
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skills and on the contrary, his social competence seems to be on a level with children 
who are autistic. 
 
In many respects Robert and John resemble sighted children who are autistic. But if 
we are to draw comparison between autism and blindness based on these three 
cases where does Katie fit in? Katy certainly provides a singular example of a very 
bright child with profound visual impairments. She has a robust understanding of 
Theory of Mind, at an equivalent level to that of older sighted children. Looking at her 
real life social competence we observed earlier that some of her scores (i.e. Active 
Sociability and Social Coping) bore a resemblance to the scores of sighted children 
with autism studied by Frith et al. However, we think that a more rigorous 
assessment developed with children who do not have access to vision is essential in 
this regard. If a child that is blind resembles a child with autism on a measure not 
specifically devised with sightedness as a factor, assessing the cause of the child’s 
performance is subsequently confounded.  
 
Screening for autism in children with profound visual impairment 
Research with children who are congenitally and totally blind is challenging and the 
relative rarity of occurrence contributes to this. Brown, Hobson, Lee and Stevenson 
(1997) carried out an extensive study with 43 children (24 of whom were children 
who were congenitally and totally blind) and in order to consider the association with 
autism. They adopted the Childhood Autism Rating Scale – CARS  (15 items) 
(Schopler et al. 1988) and Behaviours Checklist for Disordered Preschoolers – 
BCDP (Sherman, Shapiro & Glassman, 1983) as screening instruments focusing on 
real life social competence.  
 
An interesting comparison can be drawn between their findings and our own (Tadic, 
Pring & Swettenham). We used a different instrument to screen for autism in a 
different group of children with congenital visual impariment, namely the Autistic 
Screening Questionnaire  (ASQ) (Rutter, Anderson-Wood, Becket et al.,1999) The 
ASQ was developed and tested by Rutter and Lord as a reliable screening measure 
rather than a diagnostic instrument and was based on the current diagnostic criteria 
for autism. An aim of the test was to fulfil the need of research in which the 
comparison of autism with other clinical groups (in terms of autistic-like features) was 
 10
desired (Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999). It includes 40 items 
assessing behaviours such as pronoun reversal, eye gaze, compulsions and rituals, 
unusual attachment to objects, imaginative play, repetitive use of objects, offering to 
share, etc.  According to Rutter et al. a cut-off score of 15 or morer provides the best 
differentiation of pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) (including autism) from 
other diagnoses for children age at least 4 years. A much higher cut-off score of 22 
or more would be required to separate autism from other PDDs (Rutter et al., 1999; 
Berument et al.,1999).  
 
In our study the ASQs were completed by the carers (teacher and/or LSA) of 18 
children who were congenitally and totally blind. There were a variety of aetiological 
causes for visual impairment in this group: Leber’s Amaurosis (4), Retinopathy of 
Prematurity (3), Congenital Micropthalmia (4), Retrolental Fibroplasia (1), Congenital 
Glaucoma (1), Retinal Dysplasia (1), Retinal Detachments (1), Anopthalmia (1) and 
other unspecified causes (2). The children were between 8-15 years of age (mean 
age 8.67) with a male to female ratio being 2:1.  
 
Three out of eighteen children (approximately 17 %) in our study received a score of 
22 or over (mean score of 27.7) and eleven out of eighteen (61 %) received a score 
greater than (mean score of 19.55). Even though a score of 22 or over is required to 
separate autism from other PDDs the percentage of children who can be classified 
under the PDD (including autism) in this group was striking. This result provides 
strong and independent support for the findings by Hobson and his team (e.g. Brown 
et al., 1997; Hobson, Lee & Brown, 1999) who argued that there was a range of 
“autistic-like” clinical features in children who are congenitally blind. In addition, in 
our study no clear relationship emerged between the IQ data and severity of autistic 
features but this is likely to be associated with the smaller sample. Nevertheless, our 
general conclusion is that in looking at autistic features in our group of children who 
are congenitally blind a high number met the criteria. Blindness may predispose a 
child to autistic-like psychopathology. 
 
 
MEMORY IN INDIVIDUALS WITH PROFOUND VISUAL IMPAIRMENTS 
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We have noted that initial delays in development of a child with profound visual 
impairment can sometimes be overcome in later years. Nevertheless, without visual 
experience cognition is likely to retain some specific characteristics. It is interesting 
to ask whether the later cognitive characteristics of children and adults who were 
born blind can provide any evidence of such alternative learning strategies. In the 
next section below we describe attempts to investigate this with school age children 
and adults with congenital and total blindness and in particular refer to memory 
processes. 
 
Memory can refer to many different aspects of mental processing including both 
content and recollection. In this section autobiographical memory studies are 
described along with memory both in the long and short-term. Additionally, memory 
for pitch is considered since it links with the following section on talent and 
exceptional abilities. 
 
 Autobiographical memory 
 Autobiographical memory is comprised of biographical information and experienced 
events related to the self. Currently there is agreement on some of the broad 
cognitive features of this type of memory, in particular that autobiographical 
memories are mental constructions that very often feature imagery while 
simultaneously containing abstract personal knowledge (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000 for a review). Conway and his colleagues have developed a strong theoretical 
formulation in which retrieval involves access to an autobiographical knowledge base 
that contains hierarchical layers ranging from conceptual and abstract memories to 
highly specific details of individual events. These memories have, for most people, a 
strong (visual) imagery component; giving the memory its sense of immediacy. This 
central role of visual imagery has been highlighted in both observation and research 
(Brewer, 1986; Williams, Healey & Ellis, 1999). 
 
Surprisingly little is known about this type of memory in individuals who are born 
blind and it could be that since visual images have traditionally been viewed as an 
integral part of remembering the past, visual impairment could have negative 
consequences on autobiographical memory. But our research ( e.g. Goddard & 
Pring, 2001) revealed no evidence that visual impairment was associated with a 
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deficient access to the past. Instead we found that individuals with total and 
congenital blindness even demonstrated a memory advantage in personal 
biographical/semantic memory. This was tested using a fluency task where 
participants generated names of people (e.g. friends and teachers) associated with 
different periods in their life.  When comparing the mean number of names produced 
in recall, a standard recency effect emerged; significantly fewer names were recalled 
from primary school compared to both secondary school and 3 years post school. 
Critically, participants who were blind showed an advantage over the sighted with an 
improved ability in recalling names from primary and secondary school. No group 
differences occurred in the more recent time frame. Of course this advantage, 
demonstrated by those who were visually impaired, could be due to an exposure 
effect rather than the effects of visual impairment on memory. It is not uncommon for 
children with a profound visual impairment to attend boarding school where teachers 
(and maybe also friends) are likely to have a greater impact on one's life experience. 
Thus the greater fluency observed in the visually impaired may be associated with a 
larger pool of possible names upon which to draw, which in turn are better 
remembered because of their greater emotional significance. Alternatively the 
advantage observed might be explained with a superior encoding process related to 
attentional strategies, which in turn could be directly related to a lack of vision and it 
is this interpretation that is supported by other findings outlined below. 
  
Verbatim, long and short-term recall 
Bartlett wrote in his 1932 book on remembering that in the process of learning we 
tend to forget the exact material, the learning episode itself, but instead we 
remember the gist or the overall meaning of the material.  It was of some interest 
then that in some early studies on memory performance we found that children and 
adults who were blind did not forget their experience in quite the same way as their 
sighted counterparts. Their recall was remarkably accurate and often exceeded that 
of sighted individuals.  Certainly in terms of short-term memory performance we 
have known for some time that children with visual impairments perform particularly 
well on ‘digit span' i.e. accurately recalling the order of a string of numbers (e.g. 
Smits & Mommers, 1978). But we also found that this above average performance 
extended to many types of material not just number strings. For instance in a study 
where blind children were asked to listen to a text and make inferences about the 
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material, we found that they recalled the exact wording of sentences they heard 
(Edmonds & Pring, 1995) significantly better than closely matched sighted control 
children. Furthermore, adults and children who were born blind had superior recall 
for random word lists, presented both in Braille and on cassette tape (e.g. Pring, 
1988; Pring & Painter, 2002). It was difficult to explain such superior 'verbatim' 
memory performance. Reference to the increased attention to the remaining 
channels of input when vision was not available, and the need for an extra or 
attenuated temporary storage buffer holding the contents of direct sensory 
experiences which could be ‘read-out’ later were proposed as explanations.  
 
While it is the case then that in terms of verbatim memory, recall is superior in 
people with visual impairment, no such superiority has been reported in connection 
with ‘gist’ memory; the type of conceptual, long-term memory mentioned by Bartlett.  
Indeed in our research, there have been a minority of studies where such conceptual 
or semantically-based memories have been worse than that of the sighted (Pring, 
1988; Pring & Painter, 2002). It is likely that differing attentional resource allocations 
will have both advantages and, under some circumstances, disadvantages.   
 
This general pattern of increased memory performance, particularly for unassociated 
items has been cited as a significant feature of autism (e.g. Frith 1989). In autism, it 
has been shown that memory for unassociated items, such as words or colour 
sequences, is only marginally less accurate than memory for associated items.  This 
is unusual since association generally predicts increased recall accuracy. Frith 
argues that in the case of autism the  'lack of preference for coherent over incoherent 
stimuli must be regarded as abnormal' and links it to her belief that in autism, the 
inability to draw together information so as to derive coherent and meaningful ideas 
and the failure of the mind to be predisposed to do so, explains the essential 
features of autism. This theory of autism referred to as ‘weak central coherence’ has 
received considerable support (Frith, 1989; Happé , 1999) and is elaborated upon in 
the context of talent. 
 
Sensory memory: Pitch processing 
If it is true that people without vision do have a greater ability to retain sensory 
experience for longer periods than those who are sighted, then the result should 
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extend from verbal material to pure sensory experience. It is hard to test this but in 
one attempt we prepared a cassette tape where approximately 20 words were 
presented one at a time and then participants were asked to recall them.  But 
critically, in this study we focussed not on the memory for words but on the pitch of 
the voice that spoke the words on the tape (i.e. a low pitched man’s voice or a higher 
pitched woman’s voice). As predicted, what we found was that the individuals who 
were blind were significantly better at accurately recalling whether a man or woman 
had spoken the previously presented words (Pring & Painter, 2002).  Their memory 
for the pitch of the voice speaking the words was clearly retained. It seems that 
paying increased attention to the available channels of the perceptual world and 
perhaps retaining that material for longer, has real advantages not least in terms of 
pitch processing. Indeed, this may help to explain the fact that individuals without 
sight seem to have a higher occurrence of absolute pitch ability than is normally 
found in the population (Oakes, 1955). This ability is extremely rare in the general 
population, estimated to be around 1 in 10,000 (Takeuchi & Hulse, 1993). 
Remarkably, in our study using the ASQ described earlier we have found that 8 out 
of 12 parents of blind children asked to comment on talent responded that their 
children had absolute pitch. This may be one explanation of why piano tuning has 
historically been a favoured occupation for people with visual difficulties. The nature 
of absolute pitch and the memory advantages outlined above have consequences 
for the understanding of both musical processing and exceptional ability. So we turn 
next to research with groups of individuals with exceptional abilities and ask if a 
predisposition to develop high level skills could reside both in individuals with autism 
as well, perhaps, as in blindness. 
 
TALENT 
Research that is concerned with the question of exceptional ability is hampered by 
the fact that so little is known about the determinants of talent and the conditions for 
nurturing its manifestation. For example there is an ongoing debate between those 
who argue in favour of practice as the key to skill acquisition (Ericsson, Krampe & 
Tesch-Romer, 1993) and those who see basic, possibly inherited, aptitude, as critical 
(Gagné, 1998). Green and Gilhooly (1992) summarised the cognitive performance of 
experts in comparison with novices. They mention superior memory performance, 
more elaborated problem-solving strategies and knowledge structures but 
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emphasise that rarely are there any differences in terms of basic memory capacity.  
Implicit learning plays a larger role in the development of expertise and is 
emphasised in many influential models of cognitive architecture such as Anderson's 
Active Control of Thought (ACT) model, developed over the last twenty years (e.g. 
Anderson, 1993). Implicit learning does not involve conscious, attention-demanding 
resources and has been linked to the notion of innate genius. The existence of child 
prodigies such as Mozart has been taken as evidence of this phenomenon, although 
challenged by Howe, Davidson and Sloboda (1998). These authors go on to stress 
the problems of defining terms such as ‘motivation’, ‘aptitude’ or ‘talent’ itself and 
have instead emphasised the important role of practice.  
   
Research with individuals with autism and exceptional ability 
Nevertheless whatever it is that determines talent with all that it entails, it is natural to 
be astounded by cases of exceptional ability juxtaposed with low cognitive 
functioning . Langdon Down in the late 19th Century and later Kanner in the context 
of autism provided the first reports of these individuals. The savants described in the 
literature display conventional talents in restricted domains. They generally fall within 
the spectrum of autistic disorders and have been the subject of theoretical and 
empirical investigations (e. g. Treffert, 1989, Hermelin, 2001, Miller, 1989). The types 
of skills exhibited by savants include lightning and calendrical calculation (Pring & 
Hermelin, 2002), drawing (Pring, Hermelin & Heavy, 1995; Selfe, 1978), poetry 
(Dowker, Hermelin & Pring, 1996), hyperlexia (Frith & Snowling, 1983, Mehegan & 
Dreifuss, 1972), linguistics (Tsimpli & Smith, 1998) and music (Hermelin, O’Connor & 
Lee, 1987).  
 
Neil O’Connor and Beate Hermelin designed the first empirical studies of groups of 
savants and the empirical work referred to in this section are nearly all ones carried 
out by the first author together with Beate Hermelin in the last 14 years or so (see 
Hermelin, 2001). We explored savant cognition by using both single case and group 
studies.  
 
The question of why autism, in particular, seemed to be linked with cases of savant 
talent was one line of research that we pursued (e.g. Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 
1995).  The answer seemed to be indicated by the 'weak central coherence’ theory 
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mentioned earlier. In one part of this theory it is argued that individuals with autism 
adopt a perceptual strategy where an interest and bias towards the processing of 
segments of a display or experience takes precedence over the processing of the 
whole display or experience. Attention is given to the local processing of individual 
parts rather than to the processing of the global or wholistic display.  
 
We have argued (e.g. Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995; Pring & Hermelin, 2002) that 
there is a link between the expression of talent and this cognitive architecture 
characteristic of individuals with autism. The tendency to draw away from the 
integration of information to form an overall contextually meaningful and coherent 
representation may be a characteristic that is both unconventional and has certain 
properties that support talented thinking. The extent to which an individual uses such 
a segmentation strategy, as seen when perceptual coherence is weak, can be 
measured by their performance on psychometric tasks such as the block design test 
of the embedded figures task. Indeed Shah & Frith (1993) neatly demonstrated that 
the superior performance by children with autism compared to mental-age matched 
controls, was due to an ability to segment the configuration into its constituent parts 
and thus reconstruct the overall pattern, without the interference of the cohesive 
nature of the total gestalt.  
 
The reasoning is the same for understanding the characteristic advantage shown by 
individuals with autism who speedily locate hidden or embedded figures in a display 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe & Mortimer, 1997; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1986). When 
using the children's embedded figures test Shah and Frith (1993) made the point that 
the participants' superiority in comparison with a mental-age matched control group 
resulted from them being unhindered by the overall meaningful context, within which 
the simple figure was embedded.  
 
From our perspective we wanted to ask if such a strong segmentation strategy, as 
has been seen in autism, would play an important role in the manifestation of talent 
amongst the autistic artists in particular, but also, amongst individuals with talent but 
without impairments. 
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Autistic savant artists 
Some of the most pertinent data we collected linking the ability to draw and to weak 
coherence came from studies with a group of autistic artists who were at entry level 
to foundation art school (described in a paper by Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995). 
We found that in a block design test that the artists who were autistic were 
significantly faster compared to their non-gifted, diagnosis and IQ matched controls. 
The savant artists seem to display especially strong segmentation skills that allow 
them to overcome the coherence of the visual displays even in comparison with their 
autistic counterparts without specific talent in drawing. Pring and Hermelin's 
postgraduate student Nicola Ryder (Ryder, 2003) tested a group of 9 autistic artists 
with a similar task, the embedded figures test. Table 2.4 below shows her results, 
namely that savant artists and art students were significantly quicker in locating a 
simple pattern from a meaningful or abstract context when compared to a  mental-
age matched autistic control group. 
 
 
Place Table 2.4 about here 
 
Although the small numbers advise caution our interpretation was that the group of 
savant artists fell at the extreme end of the continuum for showing the effects of a 
segmentation strategy. We hypothesised that the thinking style emphasising 
segmentation, found in individuals with autism, supports or is a precursor of the 
manifestation of critical talented abilities. Perhaps the attention to detail and away 
from the context affords a fresh access to visual ideas.  
 
Segmentation style and talent 
The work described briefly above with savant artists suggested to us that such 
segmentation processing might not only be the key to the prevalence of autistic 
individuals amongst savant artists, but could also link specific modular abilities to 
modular talents found in the general population. To test this we matched talented 
artistic children, selected by teachers, with a control group of children on age and 
verbal IQ. What we found was that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the children who could 
draw were also significantly faster at completing the block design test (Pring, 
Hermelin & Heavey, 1995). Similarly, university art students also were significantly 
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faster at finding embedded figures than were IQ matched university psychology 
students (Ryder, Pring & Heremlin, 2002). These results with gifted children and 
adults artists echo earlier findings made in the context of creativity with students from 
the prestigious Chicago School of Art (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976). 
  
It seems that segmentation strategy is a cognitive style can be emphasised in those 
with artistic talent and perhaps this enables them to hold basic elements or parts of a 
visual display quite separately and uniquely protected from the context in which they 
appear. In this way the individuals can resist the integration with familiar and learnt 
associations that develop as a natural consequence of dealing with the whole. For 
some talented individuals without other impairments, it may be that segmentation 
strategies are simply an optional ‘mind-set’ by which to view and experience the 
world. Through practice or by natural inclination the ability to break conventional 
associations and gestalt processes through a characteristic cognitive style may be 
an important element in displaying talents, at least in some domains. 
 
 Absolute pitch abilities and musical savants 
What would be the manifestation of such an enhanced segmentation strategy? One 
possibility would be the enhanced perception and retention of discrete auditory 
elements such as pitches or tones in music. One example of such a special type of 
processing with music is the ability to show absolute pitch. Absolute pitch (AP) is the 
ability to recognise, label and remember pitch information without reference to an 
external standard.. To develop this ability you need to hold a single note in mind, 
associate it with a verbal label, and keep it separate from other musical 
representations.  Normally we hold musical notes in a relational way so that if we are 
given an anchor note such as middle C we can then move up or down an octave. 
People with absolute pitch hold the musical notes independently and can therefore 
retrieve them directly from memory without referring to other notes.  AP is not a 
necessary component of musical ability or talent and many professional musicians 
do not possess it.  The separation of AP and musical ability has been confirmed in 
neurological terms by brain imaging studies that discriminate the brain structure of 
musicians with AP from musicians and non-musicians without AP (Schlaug, Jancke, 
Huang & Steinmetz, 1995).  
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Early musical instruction influences the development of AP (Takeuchi & Hulse, 1993) 
in certain individuals and is also associated with increased spatial abilities in 
adulthood (Eastlund-Gromko & Smith Poorman, 1998). In particular, people with AP 
perform better on the Hidden Figures Test than those with relative pitch or non-
musicians (Costa-Giomi, Gilmour, Siddell & Lebfebvre, 2001). We reasoned that AP, 
in the same way as the good performance on the Hidden Figures Test, was an index 
of weak coherence.  If this were the case then children with autism might be 
predisposed to show exceptional AP abilities. In a series of elegant studies on 
musical cognition in children with autism Heaton (1998; Heaton, Hermelin & Pring, 
1998) found support for this suggestion. She was the first to confirm that AP is 
prevalent amongst children with autism and is linked to special musical abilities. AP 
is universal to all musical savants (e.g. Miller, 1989) and is probably necessary for 
such individuals to implicitly learn, store and recall the use of the rules and patterns 
that govern music. Certainly Hermelin & O’Connor (1986) argued that implicit 
learning and the extraction of the rules and regularities of musical grammar allow 
savants to create accurate reproductions of musical pieces.  
 
Recently, an undergraduate student, Katherine Woolf, examined the pitch and 
rhythm processing abilities of five musical savants who were congenitally blind. They 
played a variety of musical instruments and had a varied cognitive profile ranging 
from severely to mildly retarded. Their performance confirmed their musical abilities 
and they all showed excellent AP. In addition, their performance on both a short-term 
memory for tone test and a more complex memory for rhythm test was either 
comparable or better than a group of sighted musicians without any cognitive 
impairment.  Performance on the rhythm task in particular supported the notion that 
music processing is modular with some individual features, such as rhythm, 
developing independently (Woolf, Pring & Tadic, in preparation).  
 
Treffert (1989) commented on the relatively common triad of mental impairment, 
musical genius and congenital blindness and Miller (1989) suggested that the 
linguistic and social problems associated with congenital blindness might be a 
contributing factor in the development of musical and in particular, absolute pitch 
ability. However, for us the critical perspective is somewhat different. We suggest 
that children who are blind, perhaps because of their dominant available sensory 
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channels and their lack of vision, begin to develop weak coherence and this may be 
the explanation for their AP abilities. In some rare individuals this provides the basis 
from which to develop exceptional musical talent. 
 
In Conclusion 
 
In 'Seeing and Hearing and Space and Time' Neil O'Connor and B. Hermelin (1978)  
concluded that the characteristic processing style of children with autism or those 
who were blind or deaf depended on their distinctive sensory input or their possibility 
for decoding it. Here we continue in their tradition and have tried to show how early 
childhood behaviour, memory performance and talent abilities in children and adults 
with visual impairments connect to the features of autism that have been described 
in the literature. The cognitive strategies imposed by the lack of sight, and the failure 
to ‘see’ as can be argued in autism, have some similar consequences. It is clear that 
many congenitally blind children show autistic-like psychopathology and a number of 
these children meet the full diagnosis of autism.  This has been linked to the role of 
vision in the development of Theory of Mind, which in blind children as we have 
shown (Cupples et al. 1999) is often delayed. We have illustrated this by describing 
research in socio-cognitive development in young congenitally blind children and 
most clearly through presenting three case studies of individual blind children. But 
what we have also understood is the crucial notion that not all blind children are 
autistic, not all of them manifest autistic-like features. This we have shown by 
describing Katy who is an example of a blind child with a typical socio-cognitive 
development of a sighted child. If lack of vision predisposes a child to autistic-like 
psychopathology then it must be possible to intervene with this specific aspect of 
blind children’s development. If we understand this we can effectively circumvent 
delays/disturbances in development of a blind child and proceed to consider 
intervention studies. 
 
 The work described with talent and memory performance refers itself to the 
cognitive architecture that is likely to develop in a range of individuals both with talent 
and with impairments such as autism or blindness. First we noted that there were 
some similarities between the characteristic memory pattern found in children and 
adults who are blind and those with a diagnosis of autism. It is not certain whether 
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the weak central coherence account helps to explain the memory advantages 
described for individuals who are blind but we would argued that it is likely. This was 
linked to the proposition that the strong perceptual segmentation strategy that follows 
from weak coherence is a characteristic of those individuals who display certain 
talent in general and autistic talent in particular.  
 
We have tried to illustrate with examples from our research how the impairments in 
autism as well as congenital blindness may lead to the adoption of mental strategies 
that through shared characteristics have similar but not always the same 
consequences.  
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Table 2.1: The 3 children’s verbal IQ scores as measured by WISC-R (1977) and WPPSI (1967) 
 
Verbal IQ Katy Robert John 
ull 
ver
bal 
IQ 
 
145 90 95 
Information 
 
18 6 9 
Similarities 
 
18 10 9 
Vocabulary 
 
15 13 9 
Comprehension 
 
17 6 5 
Digit Span 
 
17 7 14 
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Table 2.2: The 3 children’s performance on standard Theory of Mind assessments 
 Katy Robert John 
1st order ToM task 
max=8 
8 1 (1st session)  
8 (2nd session) 
5 (1st session) 
3 (2nd session) 
2nd order ToM task 
max=4 
4 2 fail 
Advanced ToM task 
max=6 
5 fail fail 
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Table 2.3: The 3 children’s performance on everyday assessment using Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scale (Sparrow et al., 1984) and Active and Interactive sociability items (Frith et al., 1994)  
 Katy Robert John 
Expressive 
communication 
max=26 
22 12 13 
Social Coping Skills 
max=32 
12 8 19 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
max=16 
8 0 3 
Active Sociability* 
max=14 
5 1 5 
Interactive 
Sociability*  
max=14 
5 3 3 
*Active Sociability: independent of ToM skills, Interpersonal Sociability: dependent on ToM skills 
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Table 2.4: The mean performance of artistic savants, art students and autistic controls on Embedded 
Figures Test 
 Meaningful (Children's 
Embedded Figures Test) 
Abstract (Adult Embedded 
Figures Test) 
Savant Artists 5.70 (3.54) 6.54 (5.37) 
Autistic Control Group 11.29 (8.91) 10.42 (6.82) 
Art Students 4.71 (2.67) 4.43 (2.69) 
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Summary:  
 
The authors explore associations between autism and blindness by focusing firstly 
on early childhood behaviour in children who are blind and later on the verbal and 
auditory memory of children and adults with visual impairments.  Moreover, the 
cognitive architecture associated with talent is linked to both groups.   
 
